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An Anticipative Feedback Solution for the Infinite-Horizon, Linear-Quadratic, Dynamic, Stackelberg Game (en Inglés)
U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
(Autor)
·
Baoline Chen
(Autor)
·
Peter A. Zadrozny
(Autor)
·
Bibliogov
· Tapa Blanda
An Anticipative Feedback Solution for the Infinite-Horizon, Linear-Quadratic, Dynamic, Stackelberg Game (en Inglés) - Chen, Baoline ; Zadrozny, Peter A. ; U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
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Origen: Estados Unidos
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Reseña del libro "An Anticipative Feedback Solution for the Infinite-Horizon, Linear-Quadratic, Dynamic, Stackelberg Game (en Inglés)"
This paper derives and illustrates a new suboptimal-consistent feedback solution for an infinite-horizon, linear-quadratic, dynamic, Stackelberg game. This solution lies in the same solution space as the infinite-horizon, dynamic-programming, feedback solution but puts the leader in a preferred equilibrium position. The idea comes from Kydland (1977) who suggested deriving a consistent feedback solution for an infinite-horizon, linear-quadratic, dynamic, Stackelberg game by varying the coefficients in the player's linear constant-coefficient decision rules. Here feedback is understood in the sense of setting a current control vector as a function of a predetermined state vector. The proposed solution is derived for discrete- and continuous-time games and is called the anticipative feedback solution. The solution is illustrated with a numerical example of a duopoly model
