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The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005: Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 15 (en Inglés)
Combat Studies Institute
(Autor)
·
Lawrence A. Yates
(Autor)
·
Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
· Tapa Blanda
The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005: Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 15 (en Inglés) - Institute, Combat Studies ; Yates, Lawrence A.
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Origen: Estados Unidos
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Reseña del libro "The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005: Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 15 (en Inglés)"
This Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper (GWOT OP), by Dr. Lawrence Yates, provides his thoughts and analysis of the US Army's participation in stability operations (SO) since 1789. Dr. Yates, a member of the CSI Team since 1981, has spent twenty plus years intensely studying this aspect of Army operations. Prior to his retirement in 2005, CSI asked him to put in writing his impressions formed by his research in this field. The result is this monograph. Dr. Yates makes several key arguments about the Army's involvement in SO. Among the key points he makes is his contention that the Army has an institutional habit of forgetting the lesson learned about SO, when, after conducting a stability operation, it returns to conventional warfare preparation. He also point out, correctly, that the Army, which has participated in far more SO-type activities sine 1789 than it has conventional wars, has hitherto retained a mindset that stability operations are an anomaly rather than the norm in American military operations. It is our hope that this GWOT OP will be of great value in providing the military professional with a broad overview of the history of the US Army's participation in stability operations, and at least one historian's view on how well it performed. Some may disagree with Dr. Yates' views on specific aspects of his analysis; that is well and good. If this GWOT OP stimulates a vigorous debate, Dr. Yates' study will have achieved its purpose.